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818 F.2d 216
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
In re “AGENT ORANGE” PRODUCT
LIABILITY LITIGATION.
(Appeal of David DEAN).
No. 1118, Docket 85–6365.  | Argued
April 10, 1986.  | Decided April 21, 1987.
One member of plaintiff's management committee in Agent
Orange class action appealed from order of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Jack
B. Weinstein, Chief Judge, 611 F.Supp. 1452, which upheld
fee sharing agreement between lead counsel. The Court of
Appeals, Miner, Circuit Judge, held that agreement under
which certain members of management committee would
advance funds for litigation expenses and receive threefold
return on that investment out of the fee settlement was invalid
and would not be enforced in view of its potential for creating
conflict between counsel and the class.
Reversed.
West Headnotes (12)
[1] Federal Civil Procedure
Public interest or common benefit;  private
attorneys general
170A Federal Civil Procedure
170AXIX Fees and Costs
170Ak2737 Attorney Fees
170Ak2737.2 Public interest or common benefit; 
 private attorneys general
Underlying rationale for equitable fund doctrine
for award of attorney fees is belief that attorney
who creates fund for benefit of class should
receive reasonable compensation from fund for
his efforts.
5 Cases that cite this headnote
[2] Attorney and Client
Allowance and payment from funds in court
45 Attorney and Client
45IV Compensation
45k155 Allowance and payment from funds in
court
(Formerly 170Ak2737.13)
In awarding attorney fees under the equitable
fund doctrine in class action, fees are calculated
by taking the number of hours reasonably
billed and multiplying that figure by hourly rate
normally charged for similar work for attorneys
of like skill in the area, and court may then
increase or decrease that figure by examining
such factors as quality of counsel's work, risk of
litigation, and complexity of the issues.
9 Cases that cite this headnote
[3] Federal Civil Procedure
Class actions;  settlements
170A Federal Civil Procedure
170AXIX Fees and Costs
170Ak2737 Attorney Fees
170Ak2737.13 Class actions;  settlements
In fulfilling its role of protecting rights of
class when settlement is reached and attorney
fees are awarded, court should look to various
codes of ethics as guidelines for judging conduct
of counsel. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(e), 28
U.S.C.A.
5 Cases that cite this headnote
[4] Federal Civil Procedure
Class actions;  settlements
170A Federal Civil Procedure
170AXIX Fees and Costs
170Ak2737 Attorney Fees
170Ak2737.13 Class actions;  settlements
Where only retrospective review of counsel's
conduct is available when awarding attorney fees
following settlement of class action, courts are
not limited to examination of actual effects of
conduct of attorneys on the litigation; appearance
and potential effect of the conduct should also
be reviewed. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(e), 28
U.S.C.A.
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1 Cases that cite this headnote
[5] Attorney and Client
Allowance and payment from funds in court
45 Attorney and Client
45IV Compensation
45k155 Allowance and payment from funds in
court
(Formerly 170Ak2737.13)
Agreement between members of plaintiff's
management committee in Agent Orange class
action that six members would advance certain
amount for general litigation expenses and would
be reimbursed threefold that amount from the
pool of attorney fees awarded to the members
of the committee upon successful completion of
the action conflicted substantially with principles
of reasonable compensation in common fund
actions and placed class counsel in potentially
conflicting position in relation to interests of
the class, and would not be enforced. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 23(e), 28 U.S.C.A.
10 Cases that cite this headnote
[6] Attorney and Client
Contracts for division, and apportionment
Attorney and Client
Allowance and payment from funds in court
45 Attorney and Client
45IV Compensation
45k151 Contracts for division, and apportionment
45 Attorney and Client
45IV Compensation
45k155 Allowance and payment from funds in
court
(Formerly 170Ak2737.13)
Practice of allowing class counsel to distribute
general fee award in equitable fund case
among themselves pursuant to fee sharing
agreement is permissible but any such agreement
must comport essentially with principles of
fee distribution set forth in Grinnell cases
dealing with fee awards in equitable fund cases;
rejecting In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation,
81 F.R.D. 395 (D.D.C.); Del Noce v. Delyar
Corp., 457 F.Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y.). Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 23(e), 28 U.S.C.A.
7 Cases that cite this headnote
[7] Attorney and Client
Contracts for division, and apportionment
45 Attorney and Client
45IV Compensation
45k151 Contracts for division, and apportionment
Risk of providing incentive for counsel to accept
early settlement offer because of nature of fee
arrangement between counsel provides adequate
grounds for invalidating the agreement as being
inconsistent with the interests of the class.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(e), 28 U.S.C.A.
3 Cases that cite this headnote
[8] Attorney and Client
Contracts for division, and apportionment
45 Attorney and Client
45IV Compensation
45k151 Contracts for division, and apportionment
Retrospective appraisal of adequacy of
settlement cannot be standard for reviewing
arrangement between counsel for class
concerning division of fee, as test to be applied is
whether, at time that fee sharing agreement was
reached, class counsel were placed in position
which might endanger fair representation of their
clients and whether they would be compensated
on some basis other than for legal services
performed. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(e), 28
U.S.C.A.
11 Cases that cite this headnote
[9] Attorney and Client
Particular Cases and Problems
45 Attorney and Client
45I The Office of Attorney
45I(B) Privileges, Disabilities, and Liabilities
45k20 Representing Adverse Interests
45k21.5 Particular Cases and Problems
45k21.5(1) In general
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Potential conflicts of interest in context of
class litigation are not examined solely for the
actual abuse which they may cause but also for
the potential public misunderstanding they may
cultivate in regard to interests of class counsel.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 23(e), 28 U.S.C.A.
10 Cases that cite this headnote
[10] Attorney and Client
Allowance and payment from funds in court
45 Attorney and Client
45IV Compensation
45k155 Allowance and payment from funds in
court
Court's responsibility to review division of
attorney fees awarded in equitable fund case
goes beyond concern for the overall amount
of fees awarded and requires attention to fees
allocated to individual class counsel. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 23(e), 28 U.S.C.A.
3 Cases that cite this headnote
[11] Attorney and Client
Contracts for division, and apportionment
45 Attorney and Client
45IV Compensation
45k151 Contracts for division, and apportionment
Class counsel in Agent Orange class litigation
would not be viewed as having formed ad hoc
partnership for purposes of determining validity
of fee arrangement but, rather, were merely
a group of individual lawyers and law firms
associated in the prosecution of a single lawsuit.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[12] Attorney and Client
Contracts for division, and apportionment
Federal Civil Procedure
Class actions;  settlements
45 Attorney and Client
45IV Compensation
45k151 Contracts for division, and apportionment
170A Federal Civil Procedure
170AXIX Fees and Costs
170Ak2737 Attorney Fees
170Ak2737.13 Class actions;  settlements
Counsel in class action must inform court of
existence of fee sharing agreement at time it is
formulated.
9 Cases that cite this headnote
Attorneys and Law Firms
*217  Leon Friedman, Hempstead, N.Y., for appellant Dean.
Elihu Inselbuch (Gilbert, Segall and Young, New York City,
Richard B. Schaeffer, New York City, of counsel) for appellee
Agent Orange Plaintiffs' Management Committee.
Before VAN GRAAFEILAND, WINTER and MINER,
Circuit Judges.
Opinion
MINER, Circuit Judge:
Our discussion of the background and procedural history of
this litigation appears in Judge Winter's lead opinion, 818
F.2d 145. This portion of the Agent Orange appeal concerns
the district court's approval of a fee sharing agreement entered
into by the nine-member Plaintiffs' Management Committee
(“PMC”) in December of 1983. Under the agreement, each
PMC member who had advanced funds to the class for general
litigation expenses was to receive a threefold return on his
investment prior to the distribution of other fees awarded
to individual PMC members by the district court. In result,
the agreement dramatically increased the fees awarded to
those PMC members who had advanced funds to the class
for expenses, and concurrently decreased the fees awarded
to non-investing PMC members, who only performed legal
services for the class.
David Dean, lead trial counsel for the plaintiff class and a
non-investing member of the PMC, challenges the validity of
the agreement, to which he was a signatory, contending that
it violates DR 5–103 and DR 2–107(A) of the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility (“ABA Code”). The ABA Code
provisions prohibit an attorney from acquiring a proprietary
interest in an action in which he is involved and from
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dividing a fee with an attorney who is not a member of his
firm, unless such division is made pursuant to client consent
and is based upon services performed and responsibility
assumed. In addition, Dean asserts that such an agreement,
which premises the size of a fee on the amount advanced
for expenses rather than on services rendered, violates the
standards and principles developed in this circuit for the
award of *218  attorneys' fees in equitable fund class actions
and inevitably places class counsel in a position at odds with
the interests of the class itself.
Although not informed of the existence of the fee sharing
agreement until September of 1984, four months after the
parties reached a settlement, the district court approved the
agreement, holding that “there is no reason to believe that
the existence of the PMC's fee-sharing agreement had any
appreciable untoward effect on the decision to settle.” In re
“Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp.
1452, 1461 (E.D.N.Y.1985) ( “Agent Orange I ”). In essence,
the court determined that the substantial financial demands
placed upon counsel in complex multiparty litigation require
flexibility in reviewing internal fee sharing agreements so
as not to discourage future representation of large plaintiff
classes. At the same time, however, the district judge ruled
that, in all future cases, counsel must notify the court of any
fee sharing agreement at the time of its inception. In this way,
according to the district judge, “the court at the outset can
determine whether to permit the fee allocation agreement to
stand before any attorney invests substantial time and funds.”
Id. at 1463.
Because we find that the agreement before us violates
established principles governing awards of attorneys' fees in
equitable fund class actions and creates a strong possibility
of a conflict of interest between class counsel and those they
were charged to represent, we reverse the district court's
approval of the agreement. Accordingly, the fees originally
allocated by the district court, based on the reasonable value
of services actually rendered, will be distributed to the
members of the PMC.
I. BACKGROUND
In September of 1983 Yannacone and Associates withdrew
as attorneys for the class, claiming financial and management
hardships. The district court then approved appointment
of the PMC as new class counsel. The PMC was
comprised of three members—attorneys Stephen Schlegel,
Benton Musslewhite and Thomas Henderson. In re “Agent
Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 571 F.Supp. 481
(E.D.N.Y.1983). In later months the district court approved
the expansion of the PMC to encompass six additional
members, including appellant David Dean. Dean, a member
of the original panel of class counsel, had been closely
involved with the Agent Orange litigation since its inception
in 1979. In October of 1983 the district court appointed him
to be the attorney responsible for leading the preparation and
potential trial of plaintiffs' case.
In December of 1983, as a means of raising the capital
necessary for the maintenance and continuation of the
lawsuit, the nine PMC members entered into a written
fee sharing agreement whereby six of the members each
promised to advance the class $200,000 for general litigation
expenses. The agreement provided that the investing
members would be reimbursed threefold from the pool of
attorneys' fees awarded to PMC members upon successful
completion of the action. The fees remaining in the pool
after the investment pay-outs would be distributed pursuant
to a fifty-thirty-twenty percent formula: fifty percent of the
remainder would be distributed equally among the nine PMC
members, thirty percent would be distributed according to
the number of hours each member expended in the case,
and twenty percent would be distributed in accordance with
certain quality and risk factors relating to each PMC member's
work in the action, as determined by a majority vote of
the PMC. All PMC members, including Dean, signed the
agreement. The district court, however, was not notified of its
existence.
The action was settled in May of 1984 and the district court,
by order dated June 11, 1984, notified counsel that petitions
for attorneys' fees were to be submitted to the court no
later than August 31, 1984. A hearing on the issue of fees
was scheduled for late September. In ordering the hearing,
the district court waived application of Rule 5 of the Local
Rules of the Eastern District of New York requiring notice
to *219  the class of all fee applications and fee sharing
agreements prior to the hearing on such fee petitions. The
court gave as its reasons “the need for continued intensive
work by the attorneys until the close of the fairness hearings
and ... the complexity of the fee applications.” Notice of
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Proposed Settlement of Class Action, reprinted in In re
“Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 597 F.Supp.
740, 867 (E.D.N.Y.1984). When the court waived application
of the local rule, it was unaware of the PMC fee sharing
agreement.
It was not until the PMC submitted its joint fee petition that
the court finally learned of the agreement. At the September
hearing on the fee petitions, the district judge expressed
doubts as to the agreement's propriety and requested further
briefing on the issue. Faced with the reservations expressed
by the district judge, the PMC members modified their
agreement in December of 1984. The revised agreement, and
the one now before us, provided that five of the six investing
members of the PMC each would advance an additional
$50,000 for general litigation expenses, bringing their total
investments to $250,000 each. In return for these advances,
as well as for the $200,000 advanced by the sixth investing
member, the new agreement provided for the same threefold
return as did the original agreement. The fifty-thirty-twenty
percent formula for the distribution of the remaining portion
of the fees, however, was eliminated. In its place, the revised
agreement called for the remainder to be distributed pro rata
to each PMC member “in the proportion the individual's and/
or firm's fee award bears to the total fees awarded.” 1  Agent
Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1454.
1 The agreement, in pertinent part, provided as follows:
When and if funds are received, either by the
AOPMC or individual members thereof, the first
priority distribution will be to distribute to Messrs.
Brown, Chesley, Henderson, Locks, O'Quinn and
Schwartz, an amount equivalent to the actual
monies expended for which these six signatories
were responsible toward the common advancement
of the litigation up to $250,000.00 with a multiplier
of three (i.e., none of these six individuals will
receive more than $750,000.00 each), which shall
be paid to them for having secured the funds
for the AOPMC and to Messrs. Dean, Schlegel
and Musslewhite an amount equivalent to the
actual monies expended by these three signatories
toward the common advancement of litigation up
to $50,000.00 with a multiplier of three (i.e., none
of these three signatories will receive more than
$150,000.00 each). Any additional expenses will be
reimbursed without a multiplier as ordered by the
Court.
All of the expenses plus the appropriate multiplier
will be deducted from the total fees and expenses
awarded by the Court to all of the AOPMC firms.
The remaining fees will then be distributed pro rata
to each signatory in the proportion the individual's
and/or firm's fee award bears to the total fees
awarded.
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611
F.Supp. 1452, 1454 (E.D.N.Y.1985) (quoting Revised
Fee-Sharing Agreement, Dec. 13, 1984).
On January 7, 1985, the district court issued a Memorandum
and Order awarding over $10 million in fees and expenses
to the various counsel whose work had benefitted the class,
applying the principles of fee distribution in equitable fund
actions set forth in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495
F.2d 448 (2d Cir.1974) (“Grinnell I ”) and City of Detroit
v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir.1977) (“Grinnell
II ”). In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation,
611 F.Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y.1985) (“Agent Orange II ”). As
later amended and supplemented, the district court's decision
awarded over $4.7 million in fees to the nine members of
the PMC on an individually apportioned basis. David Dean,
due to his lengthy involvement in the class action and the
exceptional quality of his work, was awarded $1,424,283.75,
or over thirty percent of all fees awarded to the PMC. Each
of the six investing members of the PMC was awarded a
much lower percentage of the entire PMC fee award, with one
investor being awarded only $41,886. The highest award to
an investor was $515,163.
Once the fee sharing agreement was applied to these awards,
however, the amount of fees each PMC member was to
receive changed dramatically. In Dean's case, application of
the agreement reduced his award to $542,310, a reduction of
$881,973. In contrast, Newton Schwartz, an investing *220
member of the PMC to whom the district court awarded
$41,886, was now to receive $513,026, equivalent to an
hourly rate of $1,224.81. The awards to all other investing
members were similarly enhanced and, in turn, the awards
to the two other non-investing members were diminished,
resulting in a distortion of the district court's individual
PMC member fee awards. The total of all fees awarded by
the court to the members of the PMC, of course, remained
unchanged. 2
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2 The effect of the fee sharing agreement on the district
court's fee awards to the individual PMC members is
shown by the following chart.
Amount
of Fees
Amount
of Fees
Net
Effect
Awarded
by
Awarded
Under
of the
District
Court
the
Agreement
Agreement
Dean
(noninvestor)
$1,424,283 $542,310 -
$881,973
Schlegel
(noninvestor)
944,448 393,312 -
549,136
Musslewhite
(noninvestor)
344,657 206,991 -
137,666
Schwartz
(investor)
41,886 513,026 +
471,140
O'Quinn
(investor)
132,576 541,128 +
408,552
Brown (investor) 348,331 608,162 +
259,831
Locks (investor) 487,208 651,339 +
164,171
Chesley
(investor)
475,080 647,534 +
172,456
Henderson
(investor)
515,163 659,975 +
144,812
---------------
Brief for
Appellant at 8.
Brief for Appellant at 8.
In May of 1985, Dean moved in the district court to
overturn the fee sharing agreement, claiming that it violated
professional ethics and did not protect the rights of the class.
In a Memorandum and Order issued June 27, 1985, the court
denied Dean's motion and upheld the agreement, albeit with
some reluctance. The court found, as a factual matter, that
no conflict of interest had arisen in the litigation from the
fee sharing agreement and, consequently, that the interests
of the class in obtaining a fair and reasonable settlement had
not been impinged. Agent Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1461.
Initially, the court recognized its obligation to review the
agreement in its capacity as protector of the rights of the
plaintiff class. It then went on to examine the propriety of the
agreement under DR 2–107(A) and DR 5–103 of the ABA
Code and the practical effect of the agreement on the PMC's
representation of the class.
As to DR 2–107(A), which prohibits an attorney from
splitting his fee with another attorney not of the same
firm unless he has the consent of his client and the
“division is made in proportion to the service performed and
responsibility assumed by each,” the court determined that
the PMC should be viewed as an ad hoc law firm “formed
for the purpose of prosecuting the Agent Orange multidistrict
litigation,” Agent Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1458. The court
reasoned that the business realities of the litigation required
the PMC to be able to perform those functions ordinarily
performed by actual law firms, such as splitting fees among
its members. The district court also noted that the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) adopted
by the ABA in 1983, although not adopted in New York,
reflect “an increased recognition” of these business realities
by permitting fee sharing agreements based upon services
rendered or upon written acceptance of joint responsibility by
the attorneys if the client is advised of the participation and
does not object and the total fee is reasonable. Model Rule
1.5(e). Recognizing the practical problem of client consent
in class actions, however, the district court concluded that
its duty to protect the rights of the class ordinarily could not
be performed unless the attorneys involved notified the court
of the existence of such an agreement “as soon as possible,”
Agent Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1459.
As to DR 5–103, which prohibits an attorney from acquiring
a proprietary interest in an action in which he is involved,
the court found that the investing members acquired no
independent interest in the action because the financial return
from any initial advance for expenses was to be paid *221
from the fees otherwise awarded to the PMC members, and
thus would not affect the class fund. While the court did
recognize that a conflict of interest could arise from such an
agreement, it cautioned that complex class actions require
a more sophisticated analysis of ethical codes than ordinary
two-party cases in order not to “unnecessarily discourage
counsel from undertaking the expensive and protracted
complex multiparty litigation often needed to vindicate the
rights of a class.” Id. at 1460. Accordingly, the district
court held that a case-by-case analysis of such fee sharing
agreements to identify potential conflicts of interest should be
adopted.
The court conceded that an agreement of the sort before
it conceivably could create an interest on the part of the
investors to settle early, regardless of the benefit to, or interest
of, the class. This is because an attorney whose fee is based
upon the amount of funds advanced for expenses in an action
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will receive the same fees “whether the case is settled today or
five years from now.” Id. The court reasoned, however, that
any possible interest to settle early would have been offset by
the theoretical incentive to extend such litigation created by
the lodestar formula and concluded that, as a factual matter,
no conflict had arisen here.
The court then set forth five additional, though
nondispositive, reasons for approving the agreement. First,
the returns on the investments did not affect the class fund,
since they were paid from the fee awards of PMC members.
Second, the court recognized that the “business” of law will
at times require creative, yet ethical, methods for economical
and efficient operation. Third, without the funds advanced
by the PMC members, it was possible that the litigation
would have collapsed and neither the attorneys nor the class
would receive any payments. Fourth, the court noted that
the PMC members could have earned substantial returns,
though not quite threefold, on these same funds if they had
undertaken more traditional investments. Fifth, if the PMC
members had received the amount of fees requested in their
joint petition, nearly thirty million dollars, the extent of the
distortion of the fees by the investment agreement would have
been insubstantial.
In sum, the district court determined that the practical needs
of this form of litigation required an inventive method of fund
raising in order to guarantee effective representation of class
rights. At the same time, however, it labeled as “troubling”
the PMC's failure to inform the court of the existence of the
agreement until months after a settlement had been reached.
Id. at 1462. In light of class counsel's fiduciary obligations
to the class and the court's role as guardian of class rights
in relation to settlement review, the district court found that
both the class and the court had a right to be notified of
the existence of such an agreement. To this end, the court
proclaimed that in all future cases, class counsel would be
obligated to make the existence of a fee sharing agreement
known to the court at the time of its formation.
II. DISCUSSION
Dean's appeal presents an issue of first impression: whether an
undisclosed, consensual *222  fee sharing agreement, which
adjusts the distribution of court awarded fees in amounts
which represent a multiple of the sums advanced by attorneys
to a class for litigation expenses, satisfies the principles
governing fee awards and is consistent with the interests of
the class.
[1]  [2]  At the outset, we note that the fees in this case
were awarded pursuant to the equitable fund doctrine, first
set forth in Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. (15 Otto) 527,
26 L.Ed. 1157 (1882), and Central Railroad & Banking Co.
v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 5 S.Ct. 387, 28 L.Ed. 915 (1885).
The underlying rationale for the doctrine is the belief that
an attorney who creates a fund for the benefit of a class
should receive reasonable compensation from the fund for
his efforts. Central Railroad, 113 U.S. at 125. Because the
calculation of fees necessarily will affect the funds available
to the class, this circuit has adopted a lodestar formula for fee
computation. Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1099; Grinnell I, 495
F.2d at 471. The lodestar seeks to protect the interests of the
class by tying fees to the “actual effort made by the attorney to
benefit the class.” Grinnell II, 560 F.2d at 1099. Accordingly,
fees are calculated by taking the number of hours reasonably
billed and multiplying that figure by an hourly rate “normally
charged for similar work by attorneys of like skill in the area.”
Id. at 1098. Once calculated, the court may, in its discretion,
increase or decrease this figure by examining such factors
as the quality of counsel's work, the risk of the litigation
and the complexity of the issues. Id. Discretion to adjust the
lodestar figure upward because of superior quality, however,
is limited to exceptional situations and must be supported
by “specific evidence” and “detailed findings” by the district
court. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for
Clear Air, 478 U.S. 546, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3098, 92 L.Ed.2d
439 (1986). Adherence to these principles is essential not only
to avoid awarding windfall fees to counsel, but also to “avoid
every appearance of having done so,” Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at
469.
[3]  [4]  Of equal importance to our analysis is Fed.R.Civ.P.
23(e), which requires court approval of any settlement of a
class action suit and squarely places the court in the role of
protector of the rights of the class when such a settlement
is reached and attorneys' fees are awarded. Grinnell II, 560
F.2d at 1099. In fulfilling this role, courts should look to the
various codes of ethics as guidelines for judging the conduct
of counsel. Agent Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at 1456. In addition,
where only retrospective review of counsel's conduct is
available, courts should not be limited to an examination of
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the actual effects of such conduct on the litigation, but rather,
as the ABA Code and Grinnell I imply, the appearance and
potential effect of the conduct should be reviewed as well.
See Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 469; ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility Canon 9 (1975).
[5]  The ultimate inquiry, therefore, in examining fee
agreements and setting fee awards under the equitable fund
doctrine and Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e), is the effect an agreement
could have on the rights of a class. Because we find that the
agreement here conflicts substantially with the principles of
reasonable compensation in common fund actions set forth in
Grinnell I and Grinnell II, and that it places class counsel in
a potentially conflicting position in relation to the interests of
the class, we reverse.
Initially, it is beyond doubt that the agreement, by tying the
fee to be received by individual PMC members to the amounts
each advanced for expenses, completely distorted the lodestar
approach to fee awards. In setting fees here, the district judge
meticulously examined counsel's fee petitions in accordance
with the Grinnell decisions and arrived at individual awards
for each PMC member based upon the services that each had
provided for the class. By providing for threefold returns of
advanced expenses, however, the agreement vitiated these
principles. The distortion was so substantial as to increase the
fees awarded to one investor by over twelve times that which
the district judge had determined to be just and reasonable,
*223  and, in a second case, to decrease the otherwise just
and reasonable compensation of a non-investor by nearly two-
thirds.
There is authority for a court, under certain circumstances,
to award a lump sum fee to class counsel in an equitable
fund action under the lodestar approach and then to permit
counsel to divide this lodestar-based fee among themselves
under the terms of a private fee sharing agreement. E.g.,
Ruskay v. Jensen, No. 71–3169, slip op. at 10–13 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 18, 1981); In re Magic Marker Securities Litigation,
[1979 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,116, at
96,195 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 16, 1979); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc.,
[1979 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,921, at
95,863 (D.Del. June 4, 1979), appeal dismissed, 614 F.2d
772 (3d Cir.1980); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81
F.R.D. 395, 400 (D.D.C.1978); Del Noce v. Delyar Corp.,
457 F.Supp. 1051, 1055 (S.D.N.Y.1978). We reject this
authority, however, to the extent it allows counsel to divide
the award among themselves in any manner they deem
satisfactory under a private fee sharing agreement. Such
a division overlooks the district court's role as protector
of class interests under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e) and its role of
assuring reasonableness in the awarding of fees in equitable
fund cases. See Kamens v. Horizon Corp., [1981 Transfer
Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 98,007, at 91,218 & n. 4
(S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1981); Steiner v. BOC Financial Corp.,
[1980 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,656, at
98,490 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1980); cf. Jones v. Amalgamated
Warbasse Houses, Inc., 721 F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir.1983)
(“if the court finds good reason to do so, it may reject
an agreement as to attorneys' fees just as it may reject an
agreement as to the substantive claims”), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 944, 104 S.Ct. 1929, 80 L.Ed.2d 474 (1984). In addition,
this approach overlooks the class attorneys' “duty ... to be sure
that the court, in passing on [the] fee application, has all the
facts” as well as their “fiduciary duty to the ... class not to
overreach.” Lewis v. Teleprompter Corp., 88 F.R.D. 11, 18
(S.D.N.Y.1980).
A careful examination of those decisions permitting internal
fee sharing agreements to govern the distribution of fees
reveals no case where return on investment was a factor. More
important, in a number of those cases the courts apparently
assumed that the internal fee sharing agreement would
be based substantially on services rendered by individual
counsel. E.g., Ruskay, slip op. at 14 n. 4 (“Since the court
has satisfied itself that the proposed distribution will not
result in compensation beyond services performed, it declines
to overrule the agreement.”); In re Ampicillin Antitrust
Litigation, 81 F.R.D. at 400 (“Since the fee application
purports to be based upon the rates and time spent by the
several attorneys, it is presumed that these factors also weigh
heavily in this internal agreement.”).
[6]  Accordingly, while the practice of allowing class counsel
to distribute a general fee award in an equitable fund case
among themselves pursuant to a fee sharing agreement is
unexceptional, we find that any such agreement must comport
essentially with those principles of fee distribution set forth
in Grinnell I and Grinnell II. This does not mean that a fee
sharing agreement must replicate the individual awards made
to PMC members under the district court's lodestar analysis.
Even after the court makes the allocation, the attorneys may
be in a better position to judge the relative input of their
brethren and the value of their services to the class. See
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In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. at 400. Nor
does this mean that class counsel need follow, line by line,
the lodestar formula in arriving at an agreement as to fee
distribution. Obviously, the needs of large class litigation may
at times require class counsel, in assessing the relative value
of an individual attorney's contribution, to turn to factors more
subjective than a mere hourly fee analysis. It does mean that
the distribution of fees must bear some relationship to the
services rendered.
In our view, fees that include a return on investment present
the clear potential for a conflict of interest between class
counsel *224  and those whom they have undertaken to
represent. “[W]henever an attorney is confronted with a
potential for choosing between actions which may benefit
himself financially and an action which may benefit the class
which he represents there is a reasonable possibility that some
specifically identifiable impropriety will occur.” Zylstra v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir.1978). The
concern is not necessarily in isolating instances of major
abuse, but rather is “for those situations, short of actual abuse,
in which the client's interests are somewhat encroached upon
by the attorney's interests.” Court Awarded Attorney Fees,
Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237,
266 (Oct. 8, 1985). Such conflicts are not only difficult to
discern from the terms of a particular settlement, but “even
the parties may not be aware that [they exist] at the time of
their [settlement] discussions,” id. This risk is magnified in
the class action context, where full disclosure and consent are
many times difficult and frequently impractical to obtain.  In
re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 93 F.R.D. 485,
490–91 (D.Md.1982); Gould v. Lumonics Research Ltd., 495
F.Supp. 294, 297 n. 6 (N.D.Ill.1980).
[7]  The district court recognized that the agreement
provided an incentive for the PMC to accept an early
settlement offer not in the best interests of the class, because
“[a]n attorney who is promised a multiple of funds advanced
will receive the same return whether the case is settled today
or five years from now.” Agent Orange I, 611 F.Supp. at
1460. Given the size and complexity of the litigation, it seems
apparent that the potential for abuse was real and should
have been discouraged. Unlike the district court, however,
we conclude that the risk of such an adverse effect on the
settlement process provides adequate grounds for invalidating
the agreement as being inconsistent with the interests of the
class. The conflict obviously lies in the incentive provided to
an investor-attorney to settle early and thereby avoid work
for which full payment may not be authorized by the district
court. Moreoever, as soon as an offer of settlement to cover
the promised return on investment is made, the investor-
attorney will be disinclined to undertake the risks associated
with continuing the litigation. The conflict was especially
egregious here, since six of the nine PMC members were
investing parties to the agreement.
[8]  The district court's factual finding, that the adequacy of
the settlement demonstrated that the agreement had no effect
on the PMC's conduct, is not dispositive. The district court's
retrospective appraisal of the adequacy of the settlement
cannot be the standard for review. The test to be applied
is whether, at the time a fee sharing agreement is reached,
class counsel are placed in a position that might endanger
the fair representation of their clients and whether they will
be compensated on some basis other than for legal services
performed. Review based on a fairness of settlement test
would not ensure the protection of the class against potential
conflicts of interest, and, more important, would simply
reward counsel for failing to inform the court of the existence
of such an agreement until after a settlement.
We also reject the district court's finding that its authority
to approve settlement offers under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e) acts
to limit the threat to the class from a potential conflict
of interest. At this late stage of the litigation, both class
counsel and defendants seek approval of the settlement.
The court's attention properly is directed toward the overall
reasonableness of the offer and not necessarily to whether
class counsel have placed themselves in a potentially
conflicting position with the class. It would be difficult indeed
for a court at this stage to hold that, regardless of the terms of
the settlement, class counsel had not fulfilled its obligation to
the class. Given this focus and other administrative concerns
that may come to bear, we find the approval authority, in
this context, to be insufficient to assure that the ongoing
interests of the class are protected. See Alleghany Corp.
v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir.1964) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting) (at this stage of litigation, “[a]ll the dynamics
conduce to judicial approval of such *225  settlements”),
cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 28, 86 S.Ct. 1250, 16 L.Ed.2d 335
(1966); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 93
F.R.D. at 491 (court authority to review settlement offers not
adequate to safeguard against dangers of conflict of interest);
Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff As Monitor
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In Shareholder Litigation, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs. 5, 26–
27 (Summer 1985) (judicial review not a significant barrier
to collusive settlements).
Equally unpersuasive is the district court's determination that
the potential incentive to settle early is offset by an incentive,
fostered by the lodestar formula, to prolong the litigation.
While a number of commentators have asserted that use of
the lodestar formula encourages counsel to prolong litigation
for the purpose of billing more hours, e.g., Wolfram, The
Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the Limit
of Proportional Discipline, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 293,
302 (Winter 1984), the formula's effect in this regard is far
from clear, see Coffee, supra, at 34–35 (“the claim that the
lodestar formula results in excessive fees is nonetheless a
red herring”); Mowrey, Attorneys Fees In Securities Class
Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J.Corp.Law. 267, 343–48
(1978) (attorneys' fees awards by district courts have not risen
since adoption of lodestar analysis); see also 7B C. Wright,
A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §
1803, at 508 (1986) (no empirical data show any incidence
of district courts awarding excessive fees). Moreover, the
court's authority in reviewing fee petitions and approving
or disapproving hours billed in an equitable fund action
works as a substantial and direct check on counsel's alleged
incentive to procrastinate. In re Equity Funding Corporation
of America Securities Litigation, 438 F.Supp. 1303, 1328
(C.D.Cal.1977); 7B C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra,
§ 1803, at 511. Consequently, we do not view the lodestar
system as countervailing the clear interest in early settlement
created by the private agreement.
[9]  Additionally, potential conflicts of interest in class
contexts are not examined solely for the actual abuse they
may cause, but also for potential public misunderstandings
they may cultivate in regard to the interests of class counsel.
Susman v. Lincoln American Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 95 (7th
Cir.1977); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015,
1017 (3d Cir.1977). While today we hold that the settlement
reached here falls within that range of reasonableness
permissible under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e), we are not insensitive
to the perception of many class members and the public in
general that it does not adequately compensate the individual
veterans and their families for whatever harm Agent Orange
may have caused. To be sure, the settlement does not provide
the individual veteran or his family substantial compensation.
Given the facts of this settlement, the potentially negative
public perception of an agreement that awards an investing
PMC member over twelve times the amount the district
court has determined to be the value of his services to the
class provides additional justification for invalidating the
agreement and applying the lodestar formula.
[10]  [11]  We find the various additional rationales for
approving the fee sharing agreement set out in the district
court's decision equally unpersuasive. First, the fact that the
returns on the advanced expenses did not directly affect
the class fund is of little consequence, since we have
already determined that the district court's responsibility
under Grinnell I and Grinnell II, as well as under Fed.R.Civ.P.
23(e), goes beyond concern for only the overall amount of
fees awarded and requires attention to the fees allocated to
individual class counsel. Second, while we sympathize with
counsel regarding the business decisions they must make in
operating an efficient and manageable practice and agree that
a certain flexibility on the court's part is essential, we are not
inclined to extend this flexibility to encompass situations in
which the bases for awarding fees in an equitable fund action
are so clearly distorted. Third, whether this class action would
have collapsed without an agreement calling for a threefold
return is a matter of speculation. Any such collapse, *226
however, would have been due to the pervasive weaknesses
in the plaintiffs' case. Fourth, we find wholly unconvincing
the district court's suggestion that the investors could have
made a sizeable return on their funds if they had invested
them in other ventures. We take notice of the fact that a
threefold return on one's money is a rather generous return
in any market over a short period of time. Fifth, while the
effect of this fee sharing agreement might have been dwarfed
to the point of insignificance if the fees awarded to counsel
had been much greater, this simply is too speculative to
defend the agreement as not affecting the interests of the class.
Finally, we do not find class counsel to have formed an ad hoc
partnership. They merely are a group of individual lawyers
and law firms associated in the prosecution of a single lawsuit,
and they lack the ongoing relationship that is the essential
element of attorneys practicing as partners.
[12]  We do agree with the district court's ruling that
in all future class actions counsel must inform the court
of the existence of a fee sharing agreement at the time
it is formulated. This holding may well diminish many
of the dangers posed to the rights of the class. Only by
reviewing the agreement prospectively will the district courts
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be able to prevent potential conflicts from arising, either by
disapproving improper agreements or by reshaping them with
the assistance of counsel to conform more closely with the
principles of Grinnell I and Grinnell II. In the present case,
however, where the district court was not made aware of the
agreement, and the potential for a conflict of interest arising
was substantial, the adoption of a rule for future cases in no
way alleviates the fatal flaws of this agreement and does not
offset the need for its invalidation.
Although appellant Dean is successful on this appeal, his
conduct has been far from praiseworthy. He freely consented
to the formation of the agreement in December of 1983 and
later to its revision in 1984. He did not even inform the district
court of the existence of the agreement or of his objections to
it until long after the settlement was reached. If he had called
the agreement into question immediately, a great deal of time
and expense could have been saved.
III. CONCLUSION
Having determined that the fee sharing agreement violates the
principles for awarding fees in an equitable fund action and
places class counsel in a position potentially in conflict with
the interests of the class which they represent, we reverse.
We award all the PMC members the fees to which the district
court determined they were entitled.
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